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ABSTRACT 
 
 Adversarial influence operations perpetrated by Islamist terrorist networks 
confront the most foundational of America’s national defense capabilities: the will of the 
American people to fight.  This assertion is predicated on four key determinations.  First, 
Islamist terrorist networks use influence operations as an integral tool of global jihad.  
Second, these adversarial influence operations should be perceived as attacks and, 
subsequently, should demand response.  Third, a wide array of US Government tools and 
institutions currently exists to counter this challenge.  Fourth, precision-strike doctrine 
and cyber-attack response frameworks provide instructional examples of methods to 
create a coordinated US Government response to such influence attacks. 
 This analysis seeks to bring two new contributions to the counter-influence policy 
dialogue.  First, based on the determination that influence attacks are legitimate matters 
of national security, this paper recommends response to these events be viewed through 
the prism of existing military doctrine.  Specifically, the same precision-strike doctrine 
used to neutralize threats with kinetic means offers an innovative framework through 
which to view response in the perception battlespace.  Second, in recognition that 
coordination is America’s current primary liability in counter-influence efforts, this 
proposal suggests the example of the United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team as a helpful model of public-private partnership from which unified counter-
influence efforts can be based.  
Alone, this proposal will not bring victory in America’s War on Terrorism.  In 
tandem with the right counter-terror policy, however, it is hoped that these ideas will add 
to the security of the next generation of Americans.
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INTRODUCTION 
 The most effective path to victory in warfare, as defined in American military 
doctrine, lies in the neutralization of an adversary’s centers of gravity.  Such centers of 
gravity–sources of “moral or physical strength, power, and resistance”–are the heart of 
the enemy’s capability and, resultantly, implicitly become a significant vulnerability 
(Joint Publication 3-0: Joint Operations, 2006, p. IV-10).  Historically, centers of gravity 
have been defined as concentric rings stretching from fielded military forces, to 
infrastructure, to leadership (Warden, 1995, p. 40-56).  The arrival of a new era of 
conflict in which many of a struggle’s most consequential actors interact only outside of 
the battlefield, however, urgently demands a revision of this guiding premise. 
Within the innermost center of gravity in America’s global war against terrorist 
networks stands the will of its population and those of its coalition partners to wage such 
struggle.1  How, then, can the United States respond to adversarial influence attacks 
against this willpower-based foundation of defense perpetrated by transnational Islamist 
terrorist networks?  The following analysis endeavors to explore this fundamental 
question through understanding of successful influence and counter-influence operations, 
sufficient historical contextualization, attention to existing military doctrine applicable to 
the influence challenge, and insight on opportunities to reshape existing institutions and 
capabilities to better respond to this threat. 
                                                 
1 Support for this assertion is drawn from the recent writing of cultural critic Michael Novak. 
Novak concludes, “Today, the purpose of war is sharply political, not military; psychological, not 
physical. The main purpose of war is to dominate the way the enemy imagines and thinks about 
the war… The primary battlefield today lies in the minds of opposing publics.” See Michael 
Novak. "What the Islamists Have Learned." Weekly Standard, November 22, 2006.  Retrieved 
November 28, 2006, from <http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000 
/012/991gvxyi.asp> 
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 In the five years since America’s declaration of a War on Terror, meaningful 
analysis has been devoted to the role of influence and perception in this conflict.  Much 
of this thinking, however, captures only half of the influence equation: though the United 
States must certainly work to improve its image through cohesive and credible public 
diplomacy focused on populations sympathetic to Islamist terrorism, it must also 
aggressively respond to influence attacks against its own citizens.  Beyond strategic 
framing of freedom, democracy, and globalization, tactical response is necessary to 
confront images of beheadings, Osama bin Laden videotapes, and media fabrications 
intended to deceive the American public. 
 The groundbreaking nature of such tactical counter-influence responses is 
reflected in the evolving language used to describe this field.  Careful observers will note 
the overlapping domain of ideas identified by terms including information warfare, 
psychological operations, strategic communications, counterpropaganda operations, 
perception management, and influence operations.  Influence Operations, the broadest 
umbrella of these ideas, refers to efforts “focused on affecting the perceptions and 
behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations.”2  Reflecting a determination 
articulated by RAND Corporation researchers Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwher, a reliance 
on this term stimulates discourse beyond the “means and methods” of an event.3  
                                                 
2 Influence Operations definition taken from Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5: Information 
Operations. (Maxwell, AL: Air Force Doctrine Center, January 2005), 5.  Retrieved November 
24, 2006, from <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/service_pubs/afdd2_5.pdf> Subsets of this idea 
(as defined in Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations) include Psychological Operations 
(notably reserved for foreign targets: “The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign 
attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives.”) and Strategic Communication 
(most often associated with long-term persuasion efforts coordinated across the government: 
advancing US interests “through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and 
products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power.”) 
3 Further discussion on this terminology available in K. Cragin and S. Gerwher, Dissuading 
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Subsequently, in hopes of achieving a framework flexible enough to accommodate 
innovative terrorist tactics and the broad spectrum of US Government response options, 
this analysis identifies the defensive and offensive hallmark of perception battlespace as 
influence operations. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Canadian journalist and commentator Mark Steyn rightly identifies the nature of 
the threat posed by Islamist terrorist networks that have exploited the proliferation of 
Western technology. “The dragons are no longer on the edge of the map: That's the 
lesson of 9/11,” Steyn contends, “When you look at it that way, the biggest globalization 
success story of recent years is not McDonald's or Microsoft but Islamism… And now, 
instead of the quaintly parochial terrorist movements of yore, we have the first globalized 
insurgency (Steyn, 2006).” This understanding of the true nature and scope of the 
terrorist threat was recently connected to influence manipulation by former Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld:  
There are no armies, no navies, no air forces for our military to go out and 
soundly defeat in pitched battles on land, sea or air, only rather shadowy networks 
of vicious extremists who kill other Muslims -- for the most part -- kill innocent 
men, women and children -- who attack elected governments in an attempt to 
reestablish a caliphate [sic], and who are increasingly successful at systematically 
manipulating the world media -- with the goal, the hope, the expectation, and 
periodically the success, of weakening public will of free people.4
                                                                                                                                                 
Terror: Strategic Influence and the Struggle Against Terrorism (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 
Corporation, 2005), 13-14.  Notably, Cragin and Gerwher offer a helpful definition, “An 
influence campaign uses planned operations—covert and/or overt—to convey selected 
information and indicators to foreign audiences. Such campaigns attempt to influence the 
perceptions, cognitions, and behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and 
individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign behavior 
favorable to the originator’s overall political and strategic objectives.” 
4 “Remarks as Delivered by Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld at the American Spectator 
Annual Dinner.” Defense Link News, November 16, 2006.  Retrieved November 24, 2006, from 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=3802> 
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The acknowledgement of the importance of perception in this conflict rests not only in 
the words of American officials, but also in the public statements of terrorist leaders.  As 
documented by Arizona State University’s Consortium for Strategic Communication, 
Osama bin Laden has concluded, “It is obvious that the media war in this century is one 
of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the 
battles (Corman & Schiefelbein, 2006, p. 3).” The recognition by both sides of this 
conflict of the centrality of influence operations animates the central thrust of this 
inquiry: how can American defensive strategies, technologies, and institutions better 
adapt to counter this threat? 
 Scholarly literature concerning responses to Islamist terrorist influence operations 
focuses on four key themes.  First and most prevalent are accounts of influence 
operations successfully perpetrated by these terrorist networks.  A second field of 
research characterizes recent counter-influence operations originated or supported by 
American capabilities.  A third perspective presents historical context on the recurring 
American challenge of coordinating influence response in wartime.  A final approach 
debates policy prescriptions for improved response to these influence events. 
 
Conflict in Iraq 
 Videotaped beheadings of members of Coalition forces and contractors by Iraqi 
insurgents stand out as the foremost example of compelling Islamist influence operations 
projected towards the American population.  Sajjan Gohel of the Asia-Pacific Foundation 
think tank asserts that a key feature of these operations is conduciveness to rapid 
dissemination and ability to focus attention on one dimension of an event.  In a recent 
6
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CNN interview concerning this phenomenon, Gohel concluded, “The problems are that 
the terrorists are very much in power of the media and the propaganda. And that serves 
their purpose very well, because images are translated to millions around the world 
(“Your World Today,” 2005).” 
Researchers at the U.S. Army War College have identified the logistical 
mechanisms through which such beheadings become influence operations used to impact 
targeted populations.  In one such circumstance the writers conclude, “The kidnapping of 
the Turkish workers and posting of the videotape were strategically timed to influence 
political events and weaken the resolve of NATO.”  Based on a timeline assembled by 
the Army War College writers, this operation intricately unfolded over a 72-hour 
timespan: “The videotape was aired by al-Jazeera on 26 June 2004; an article with a 
photo was published 27 June and the next day, 28 June, President Bush visited Turkey for 
the opening of a NATO summit seeking the alliance’s help in stabilizing Iraq (Jones, 
2005, p. 8).” 
Furthermore, the importance of the perception battlespace is emphasized in 
consideration of self-inflicted influence harm triggered by American actions in Iraq.  The 
April 2004 emergence of Abu Ghraib detainee abuse photos is a primary instance of this 
self-defeating phenomenon.  Writing in The Atlantic Monthly, journalist Mark Bowden 
concludes, “The photos from Abu Ghraib prison portray Americans as exactly the 
sexually obsessed, crude, arrogant, godless occupiers that our enemies say we are 
(Bowden, 2004, p. 37-39).”  These images have been exploited in Islamist propaganda 
materials and stand as a primary instance of the realization that influence does not 
substitute for policy. 
7
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The renaissance of American counter-insurgency doctrine currently unfolding in 
Iraq provides an excellent case study from which to examine the opportunity of counter-
influence operations to shift the course of battle.  Existing American military doctrine is 
based on a cycle of observation, orientation, decision, and action (known as the OODA 
Loop).  Success in executing this determination cycle “faster and more effectively” than 
an adversary yields the goal of “decision superiority” (Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5: 
Information Operations, 2005, p. 1).  As illustrated in the following diagram from the 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, decision superiority in counter-
insurgency would allow American counter-influence efforts to intervene in an insurgent’s 
decision process and potentially alter the outcome of this decision: 
 
Figure 1: Modification of Waltz Basic Information Processes Model in a 
Counterinsurgency5
 
Assessment of operations in Iraq offers a valuable microcosm illustrative of the 
importance of a global counter-influence response mechanism. 
 
                                                 
5 Robert Molinari, Winning the Minds in “Hearts and Minds”: A Systems Approach to 
Information Operations as part of Counterinsurgency Warfare (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. 
Army Command and General Staff College), 28.  Retrieved November 24, 2006, from 
<http://stinet.dtic.mil/dticrev/PDFs/ADA436114.pdf> 
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July-August 2006 Israel-Lebanon War 
An additional vivid instance of successful Islamist influence operations occurred in 
the July-August 2006 Israel-Lebanon conflict.  Though the United States was not directly 
involved in this incident, this instructive example offers insight into both the ease of 
fabrication of such manipulations and the power of such unchecked propagation.  The 
worldwide headlines resulting from this incident suggested that Israeli missiles had struck 
two clearly marked Lebanese Red Cross ambulances transporting victims on the evening 
of July 23, 2006 (Cambanis, 2006).  Public reaction to this seemingly flagrant violation 
of the rules of war dealt an indelible blow to Israel’s justification for the use of force in 
the conflict.  Through the platform of a basic website that was later highlighted on cable 
news networks, however, an ordinary California-based media consumer convincingly 
argued that media photos of the ambulance aftermath were not consistent with the story 
of a missile strike, suggesting a Hezbollah fabrication used to discredit Israel (“Fox 
Special Report With Brit Hume: Pat Buchanan Releases Immigration Book,” 2006). 
Even analysts who accept this instance as an example of the media manipulation 
and exploitation potential held by decentralized, ideologically motivated groups fail to 
grasp the gravity of this significance.  Beyond the possibility of bias in media reporting 
and the faults of the 24-hour news stream, this is a case study of a successfully executed 
influence operation.  Accountability in this matter is not the simple responsibility of those 
that reported and promulgated this deception, but those that created it.  What can be done 
to dilute the effectiveness of such tactics? 
 
Nascent Counter-Influence Responses 
9
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Particularly in the case of Iraq, recent experience suggests that some progress is 
being made in the development of counter-influence tools.  RAND Corporation 
researchers document the emergence of Iraqi Terrorism in the Grip of Justice, a nightly 
Mosul-based television program showcasing captured terrorists and Al-Hur Al-Ayn, a 
television soap opera with effective anti-terrorism themes.  While not “silver bullet” 
solutions, these developments reflect hopeful progress in the perception battlespace. 
Furthermore, the American military’s discovery and release of a humiliating 
“blooper” video starring terrorist leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi suggests a similar 
experimental tactic seeking to discredit the terrorist.  Scenes showing al-Zarqawi’s 
difficulty operating an automatic weapon and training uniform featuring Western 
sneakers seek to deflate the terror leader’s superhero status.  Arizona State University 
researchers explain, however, that the sourcing of this content limited its effectiveness: 
“While this particular release apparently did not get much traction in the Arab world 
because it was closely associated with a Western source, it is a good example of what 
could be done to undermine a terrorist’s competence and trustworthiness (Corman, Hess 
& Justus, 2006, 12).” 
 In print medium, the exploitation of an intercepted letter between Al Qaeda leader 
Ayman al-Zawahiri and Iraq-based Abu Musab al-Zarqawi that exposed disagreement 
over al-Zarqawi’s brutal tactics in Iraq is one example of American efforts to factionalize 
terrorist networks.  While the authenticity of the original letter has been legitimately 
questioned (further emphasizing its role in influence operations), the intent of its 
exposure appears successful in concerning Americans with the possibility of plans for 
expanded global jihad, as illustrated in a Pentagon press release highlighting the letter: 
10
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This media battle is why Zawahiri wants Zarqawi to stop attacks on Shiia in Iraq 
and slaughtering the hostages - they look bad on television… Once the Islamic 
government is established in Iraq, Zawahiri calls for it to expand into neighboring 
countries… But the step toward the al Qaeda's version of a perfect world starts 
with expelling the Americans from Iraq (Garamone, 2006). 
 
Further use of such methods could prove highly effective in creating confusion and 
dissension in terrorist ranks.  Helpfully, such methods also tilt the advantage of surprise 
in favor of American efforts.  A more complete understanding of tactics such as these is 
reached in the explanation of historical American counter-influence precedent. 
 
Historical Precedent of Coordination 
 In a paper coalescing his observations as the senior military advisor to the Under 
Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, Army Colonel Brad Ward 
distinctively captures the historical context of American efforts to create a unified 
response to adversarial influence operations. “Between World War I and 1986,” writes 
Colonel Ward, “there were, at least six instances where the US Government created 
national level Information or Influence type committees (Ward, 2003, p. 12).” These 
efforts–ranging from World War I’s Creel Committee, to World War II’s Office of 
Coordinator of Information (COI), to the Korean War-era Operations Coordinating 
Board, to the last NSC-level coordinating Psychological Operations Committee in 1986–
frame a strong American precedent in the influence battlespace.  A reach back to the first 
half of the twentieth century, however, is necessary to locate a definitively responsive 
American counter-influence coordination attempt, contrasted against broad and ongoing 
efforts to craft a unified US Government front in public diplomacy. 
 The September 2002 creation of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating 
Committee represents a powerful step in inter-agency influence and information 
11
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coordination (Ward, 2006, 15).  This group’s under-publicized responsibility for 
“coordinating interagency support for international broadcasting, foreign information 
programs, and public diplomacy; and promoting the development of strategic 
communications capabilities throughout government” suggests awareness among senior 
leadership of the need for an influence strategy.  Again, however, even this development 
lacks the capability of a tactical organization charged with joint response to Islamist 
terrorist influence attacks. 
 
Proposals for Response 
 Existing policy proposals to enhance America’s influence capabilities largely 
focus on strategic, long-term efforts focused on reducing general sentiments of anti-
Americanism.  Often absent from this policy discussion is a consideration of tactical 
possibilities that could be used to deflect individual influence manipulations perpetrated 
by terrorist networks.  Researchers at Arizona State University’s Consortium for Strategic 
Communication offer one of the few proposals for a tactical response: 
We envision creation of a permanent “geek battalion” dedicated to understanding, 
monitoring, disrupting, and counteracting jihadi Internet activities.  This unit 
would include to as great an extent as possible young people recruited for their 
knowledge of Internet culture and technology. (Corman & Schiefelbein, 2006, p. 
21) 
 
Columbia University Professor and member of the National Commission on Terrorism 
Richard Betts buttresses these arguments with an abstract framework calling for 
American response to these tactics should be predicated on an understanding of the 
intersection of “the imbalance of power between terrorist groups and counterterrorist 
governments; the reasons that groups choose terror tactics; and the operational advantage 
of attack over defense in the interactions of terrorists and their opponents (Betts, 2002, p. 
12
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19-36).”  Such a consideration of the dynamic between terrorist groups and 
counterterrorist governments helpfully frames the doctrinal and institutional 
recommendations of this analysis. 
 
MODEL & HYPOTHESIS 
Influence events are subordinate to the backdrop of policy that creates them.  
Influence response methods rarely overshadow this foundation of policy, a reality seen in 
the proliferation of unintended negative effects from the April 2004 Abu Ghraib abuse 
scandal or the self-evident positive outcomes of American aid response to the December 
2004 Southeast Asian Tsunami.  Influence response should not be seen as a veneer able 
to camouflage the true character of American public or foreign policy.  Complete 
understanding of the influence terrain, however, demands acknowledgement of an active 
Islamist policy in which influence manipulations play a central role. 
 The breadth of events and actors within the perception battlespace is 
overwhelming.  The challenge of simply conceptualizing this non-physical warfare 
terrain, let alone the possibility of introducing stimulus to affect system-wide change, 
may seem intractable.  This analysis seeks to focus discussion of response options to a 
limited type of events within this continuum.  Major applications of the counter-influence 
posture discussed here include correcting disinformation, limiting the value of 
kidnappings and hostages, and exposing fabrications.  Admittedly, these strategies are 
less useful in countering messages directed at the Arab world, silencing general anti-
American themes, or fully removing the media spotlight from terrorist action and leaders. 
 This analysis asserts that the Find-Fix-Track-Target-Engage-Assess (F2T2EA) 
precision engagement doctrine (Joint Vision 2010, n.d., 21) currently employed in 
13
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America’s battlefield operations can be reinterpreted as a suitable framework to guide a 
unified US Government response to influence events perpetrated by Islamist terrorist 
networks.  In conventional implementation, the time requirement goal to apply this 
engagement sequence has been reduced to 10 minutes (Hebert, 2003, p. 50-54).  Relying 
on such precedent, and as visually understood through the diagram below, the time-
sensitive nature of this doctrine enhances its applicability to the perception battlespace: 
 
Figure 2: Time Sensitive Targeting Phases6
 
Furthermore, this study holds that major requirements of this response framework can be 
met through reshaping of existing US Government capabilities.  Finally, this space will 
                                                 
6Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time-Sensitive Targets. 
(Langley, VA: Air Land Sea Application Center, April 2004), I-4.  Retrieved October 22, 2006, 
from <http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm2-22-401.pdf> 
14
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be used to identify new US Government capabilities that should be developed to address 
this challenge. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The application of the F2T2EA model to the challenge of adversarial Islamist 
influence operations is predicated on a key premise of coordination.  As already 
emphasized in military doctrine on this subject, “Information operations conducted at the 
operational and tactical levels may be capable of creating effects at the strategic level and 
may require coordination with other national agencies (Air Force Doctrine Document 2-
5: Information Operations, 2005, 1).”  This need for coordination, currently America’s 
biggest liability in counter-influence efforts, begins this new vision. 
Unity of command–often cited as the “first among equals” classical principle of 
war dictates that US Government response to Islamist operations should be coordinated 
by a central source (Dunlap, 2006, p. 42-48).  A frustrated Army War College student 
recently identified the current vacuum of such coordination in writing, “Who is in charge 
of [Information Operations]? Is it the State Department? The DOD? United States 
Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)?, United States Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM)? Office of Global Communications?, even the Field Artillery Center at Fort 
Sill, OK has been mentioned as a new major player in IO (Hardy, 2005, p. 7).” 
The work of the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) 
provides an instructional example of a public-private partnership established to detect and 
respond to intrusions.  This agency’s charter is responding to cyber attacks—reducing 
vulnerabilities, disseminating notice of attacks, and coordinating responses–offers a 
helpful model from which influence operations responses can be based (“United States 
15
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Computer Emergency Response Team Announced,” 2003).  In mirroring the success of 
this framework, this proposal calls an independently chartered United States Influence 
Incident Response Integration Center (US-IIRIC) charged with identification, mitigation, 
and response to influence operations perpetrated by Islamist terrorist networks.7  A 
representative example of the sources of expertise available to be drawn on by this 
organization include: 
• Department of Defense “media war” units (“Pentagon Boosts ‘Media War’ 
Unit,” 2006) 
• Joint and Combatant Command units (Such as US Special Operations 
Command psychological warfare units and the Joint Information Operations 
Center) 
• Service Components (Such as the US Air Force’s Operational Cyberspace 
Command [Bennett & Munoz, 2006]) 
• Department of State’s Bureau of Public Affairs (Including remnants of the US 
Information Agency absorbed into the Department of State) 
• Broadcasting Board of Governors (Responsible for oversight of Voice of 
America, al-Hurra, Radio Free Europe, and other sponsored outlets) 
• Intelligence Community (Particularly helpful in contextualizing events, liaison 
through Office of the Director of National Intelligence) 
• Law enforcement and investigative resources (Including the FBI’s Cyber 
Investigations unit) 
• Academic expertise (Such as Arizona State University’s Consortium for 
Strategic Communication) 
• Military academic expertise (Such as National Defense University’s Center 
for Strategic Communication and service war colleges) 
• Contracting services of American political campaign consultants (Moderated 
through governance of a bipartisan review panel) 
• Advisory board of major media organization representatives 
• Liaison to pertinent Department of Homeland Security offices 
 
                                                 
7 The Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic Communication has recommended the 
creation of a similar FFRDC-structured Center for Strategic Communication.  This US-IIRIC 
proposal differs, however, in its mission to respond tactically to discrete influence events.  For 
further information, see Report on the Defense Science Board Task Force on Strategic 
Communication. (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chairman of the Secretary of Defense, 
September 2004).  Retrieved October 22, 2006, from <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-
09-Strategic_Communication.pdf> 
16
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While the proposal of a new bureaucratic creation illuminates the impressive array of US 
Government resources standing ready to meet this challenge, it also exposes the present 
reality that these tools are uncoordinated, rarely operationalized, and too often under-
utilized.  Even more important than the organizational structure of this Executive Agent 
for influence, however, is the doctrine implemented to diffuse Islamist influence 
operations.  
 
ANALYSIS & ASSESSMENT 
 The following assessment seeks to offer practical insight into the implementation 
of F2T2EA doctrine as a comprehensive framework from which US Government 
counter-influence actions can be coordinated.  Notably, while the necessity for 
coordination within this effort is self-evident, this position asserts that such doctrine 
would be best implemented through the proposed US-IIRIC authority but could also be 
put into practice through existing structures.  
Before meaningful response to an Islamist influence operation can be considered, 
the presence of an unfolding operation must be detected.  Criteria should be defined that 
would separate bona fide Islamist influence operations directed at American or coalition 
populations from commonplace anti-American “chatter.”  Consideration of the context of 
an event (pending democratic elections, military operations, or other policy changes) and 
the correlation of attack characteristics with known Islamist terrorist methods 
(symbolism, surprise, power demonstration, and other disproportionate benefits) are 
examples of dimensions of this determination. 
The same persistent Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) 
umbrella employed to detect physical terrorist attack offers a comprehensive perspective 
17
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on nascent influence operations.  As such, the existing resources of the Intelligence 
Community offer the logical starting place from which to mount a lookout for unfolding 
Islamist influence operations.  The proliferation of commercial media analysis products, 
however, suggests that early open source detection methods may soon offer the 
capabilities necessary to take the lead in this effort.  One such product, CriticalTV, offers 
technology to automatically flag English and Arabic television whenever certain words 
are used (Dizard, 2006, p. 1).  According to the manufacturer’s website, “CriticalTV 
alerts users about a relevant clip seconds after a broadcast, and allows users to share the 
clip instantly within a workgroup via secure video-e-mail or a private video gallery. 
Users can also order a professional transcript or hard copy online (Dizard, 2006, p. 1).” 
Though not immune from the same potential overload of information that challenges 
classified collection methods, this technology offers a pragmatic example of the 
abundance of tools waiting to be utilized in the counter-influence effort. 
Once identified as a hostile action, an influence operation must be characterized.  
Importantly, this level of analysis moves from quantitative observation of an attack’s 
presence to qualitative judgment of appropriate prioritization for response.  Unique to the 
perception battlespace, this characterization requires not only understanding the source of 
aggression but also discerning the intended target audience and message.  Variables of 
source, motivation, transmission method, and intended audience should be analyzed to 
gauge the response prioritization level of an event. 
Based on this determination of prioritization, an appropriate amount of collection, 
analysis, and response resources should be tasked with responsibility for the event.  An 
important influence-specific threshold is passed in this tracking process: as many 
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adversarial influence attempts may fail before external interdiction, at what point does the 
trajectory of this event’s success demand response?  Given the remarkably dynamic 
nature of the global perception battlespace, careful attention must be dedicated to 
monitoring the unfolding nature of this event and the impact of other influence inputs.   
After movement through careful periods of identification and observation, 
response options to reverse, dilute, distract, or otherwise mitigate the effects of an 
influence operation must be considered.  Clausewitz’s classic Principles of War offer a 
starting point from which decisions on method of engagement can be based: objective, 
offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, 
simplicity.  Though outside the scope of this analysis, a vital opportunity exists for future 
scholarship to reinterpret these principles in light of the perception battlespace.  
This analysis contends that two tactical response options exist in countering 
Islamist influence operations.  First is a defensive posture that relies upon methods 
designed to restrict the perpetuation of the original influence operation.  Examples of 
defensive methods include kinetic or electromagnetic attack on broadcast facilities, 
quarantine of Internet distribution sites, lockdown of funding or logistical support, and 
containment of radical opinion leaders.  Second is an offensive option that seeks to 
overpower the original influence operation with a counteracting message.  Key themes of 
such remedial messages focus on creating incompatibilities between Islamist action and 
mainstream Islam, exploiting factional faults between terrorist groups, refuting 
questionable historical interpretations, and appealing to nationalism or other values. 
Influence operations do not occur in a vacuum and can rarely be seen as discrete 
events.  As such, continuing assessment of the effectiveness of countermeasures is 
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essential to mission success.  These means and this method of evaluation provides a 
tenable framework from which the United States can begin to implement an effective 
counter-influence strategy.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 Adversarial influence operations perpetrated by Islamist terrorist networks 
confront the most foundational of America’s national defense capabilities: the will of the 
American people to fight.  While the breadth of this perception battlespace is wide, this 
analysis has sought to focus attention on a limited scope of influence attacks that can be 
effectively countered.  This assertion is predicated on four key determinations.  First, 
Islamist terrorist networks use influence operations as an integral tool of global jihad.  
Second, these adversarial influence operations should be perceived as attacks and, 
subsequently, should demand response.  Third, a wide array of US Government tools and 
institutions currently exists to counter this challenge.  Fourth, precision-strike doctrine 
and cyber-attack response frameworks provide instructional examples of methods to 
create a coordinated US Government response to such influence attacks. 
 Examples such as the Hezbollah ambulance incident, beheadings in Iraq, and the 
exploitation of Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse photos reinforce the reality that influence is a 
method valued by Islamist terrorist networks.  Nascent responses including attempts to 
discredit terrorist leaders, factionalize terrorist networks, and publicize captured terrorist 
operatives suggest real progress in American counter-influence efforts.  Historical 
contextualization of these efforts reveals a persistent American challenge of coordinating 
wartime influence operations, but offers hope in the success of previous generations. 
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 This analysis seeks to bring two new contributions to the counter-influence policy 
dialogue.  First, based on the determination that influence attacks are legitimate matters 
of national security, this paper recommends response to these events be viewed through 
the prism of existing military doctrine.  Specifically, the same precision-strike doctrine 
used to neutralize threats with kinetic means offers an innovative framework through 
which to view response in the perception battlespace.  Second, in recognition that 
coordination is America’s current primary liability in counter-influence efforts, this 
proposal suggests the example of the United States Computer Emergency Readiness 
Team as a helpful model of public-private partnership from which unified counter-
influence efforts can be based.  
 The possibility of a meaningful counter-influence strategy acknowledges the 
reality that influence operations reflect but do not replace policy.  The methods described 
in this examination cannot overcome policy failures but can be used to respond to 
specific instances of aggression towards the American population.  The nature of this 
conflict suggests that only the beginnings of influence manipulations have surfaced as of 
this writing.  A compelling motivation of this proposal, however, is that American policy 
and institutions must continue to innovate and improve at or beyond the pace of 
asymmetric threats, such as Islamist influence operations, seeking to harm America.  
Alone, this proposal will not bring victory in America’s War on Terrorism.  In tandem 
with the right counter-terror policy, however, it is hoped that these ideas will add to the 
security of the next generation of Americans. 
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